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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents a matter of first impression for this Court-whether the district court
must order credit for time served for prejudgment incarceration of a dismissed and then refiled
case charging the same offense.
Jesse A. Keeton was in custody for thirty-two days following his arrest for a felony
offense. The district court later dismissed the case without prejudice due to the State's charging
error. About a month and one-half later, the State refiled and correctly charged Mr. Keeton with
the same felony offense. After Mr. Keeton pled guilty and was sentenced, he moved for thirtytwo days of credit for time served. The district court denied the motion because Mr. Keeton did
not have a sentence imposed or a judgment in the dismissed case.
Mr. Keeton now appeals. He asserts the district court's order denying credit was in error.
He argues the district court erred because the plain language of the credit for time served statute,
as well as the Court's recent decisions in State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189 (2017), and State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), mandate an award of credit for prejudgment incarceration on the

same offense in a dismissed but then refiled case.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On January 20, 2018, Mr. Keeton was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI"),
with a felony enhancement due to two prior DUis within the last ten years. (R., pp. I 00-02, 125,
126.) He was transported to Bannock County Jail. (R., p.125.) Two days later, on January 22, the
State filed a criminal complaint alleging a felony DUI. (R., pp.97-98, 126.) The case number
was CR-2018-925-FE. (R., pp.97, 126.) On February 5, 2018, the magistrate bound Mr. Keeton
over to district court after a preliminary hearing. (R., p.110.) On February 20, 2018, Mr. Keeton
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was released from Bannock County Jail. (R., p.125.) He was in custody for thirty-two days.
(R., p.125.)
In the complaint in CR-2018-925-FE, the State had alleged the two prior DUI convictions
occurred on January 17, 2017, and January 4, 2018. (R., pp.97-98, 126-27.) However, the
evidence at the preliminary hearing to prove the January 4 DUI was not a judgment of
conviction. (R., p.110.) The State's evidence was a stipulation to a plea agreement. (R., p.110.)
Accordingly, Mr. Keeton moved to dismiss CR-2018-925-FE or strike the felony enhancement
because the State was unable to prove the prior January 4 DUI conviction. (R., pp. I 05-07.) On
April 4, 2018, the district court granted his motion and dismissed CR-2018-925-FE without
prejudice. (R., pp.114-16.)
On May 1, 2018, Mr. Keeton pied guilty and was sentenced for the January 4 DUI.
(R., p.127.)
On May 24, 2018, the State refiled and, as in the first, case, alleged Mr. Keeton
committed a felony DUI on January 20, 2018. (R., pp.10-12.) Also as in the first case, the State
alleged the same two prior DUis, but this time with a corrected date for the second DUI
conviction: January 17, 2017, for the first and May 1, 2018, for the second. (R., pp.IO.) Along
with the criminal complaint, the State attached the same police report as attached with the first
complaint. (R., pp.13-17, 99-103.)
Mr. Keeton waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound him over to district
court. (R., p.47.) The State filed an Information Part I and II charging Mr. Keeton with a DUI
and the felony enhancement. (R., pp.50-51, 52-53.) Mr. Keeton pied guilty as charged.
(R., pp.74-75.)
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On November 19, 2018, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (R., p.90; see
generally Tr.) Mr. Keeton had been out of custody throughout the refiled case. (See R., pp.29,

35, 38-39, 47, 75-76.) His only time of prejudgment incarceration was from the initial arrest for
the offense on January 20, 2018, until his release on February 20, 2018. (See R., p.125.)
Accordingly, at sentencing, he asked for credit for time served. (Tr., p.5, L.20-p.6, L. 10.) He
argued:
We feel that under State versus Brand, [162 Idaho 189,] that he was incarcerated
for this DUI which occurred on January 20th. And although it's not the same case
number, it is the same offense, under Idaho Code Section 18-309, which requires
that a person receive credit for any period of incarceration prior to entry of
judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense .... And so as noted, Jesse did
spend 32 days in jail, and we're asking for credit for that time served.
(Tr., p.5, L.20-p.6, L. 10.) The State responded, "In regard to the credit for time served issues,
the state is not familiar with the case that he testifies has stated on the record but knows typically
if a charge is refiled, everything starts over." (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-12.) The district court agreed,
"That's the general rule. That's the rule I've always followed." (Tr., p.8, Ls.13-14.) The district
court withheld judgment and placed Mr. Keeton on probation for four years. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2223; R., p.91.) The district court also ordered him to serve thirty days in jail, with twenty days
suspended and ten days at the discretion of his probation officer. (Tr., p.11, Ls.7-12; R., p.91.)
On credit for time served, the district court ruled, "I disagree with [defense counsel's] analysis of
the credit for time served. I've been through that multiple times." (Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6.)
Shortly after sentencing, Mr. Keeton moved for credit for time served pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(c). (R., pp.94-96.) He asked the district court to reconsider its ruling from
sentencing. (R., p.94.) Mr. Keeton argued, under LC. § 18-309 and Brand, he was entitled to
credit because he was subject to prejudgment incarceration for an offense and then sentenced on
the same offense, despite the State's initial charging error. (R., p.95.) In support of his motion,
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Mr. Keeton included: (1) the criminal complaint and police report from the dismissed case (CR2018-925-FE); (2) his motion to dismiss or strike the felony enhancement in CR-2018-925-FE;
(3) the district court's order granting the motion to dismiss; (4) the criminal complaint and police
report in the instant, refiled case; and (5) a letter from the Bannock County Sheriffs Office on
Mr. Keeton's thirty-two days of prejudgment incarceration in Bannock County Jail in CR-2018925-FE. (R., pp.97-125.)
On January 9, 2019, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.126-28.) The district
court reasoned:
This directive [in LC. § 18-309] is mandatory, in that a court must
award a defendant credit for prejudgment incarceration. [State v. Horn, 124
Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1993)]. The converse is also true,
and a "defendant is not entitled to credit under LC. § 18-309 for any time not
actually spent incarcerated before judgment." [State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17,
21, 319 P.3d 501, 505 (Ct. App. 2014).] A plain reading of the statute reveals that
it only confers a right to credit "if the presentence incarceration was a
consequence of or attributable to the offense for which the sentence is imposed
(emphasis added)." [State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168
(Ct. App. 2005).] The credit only applies to cases where a judgment has been
entered. The statute applies to "all offenses that provide a basis for the
defendant's incarceration." [State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 192, 395 P.3d 809,
812 (2017).]
Here, Keeton did not have a sentence imposed in CR-2018-925-FE,
as the case was dismissed. In the present case, Keeton was not incarcerated
before judgment was entered on November 19, 2018. As there was no time
spent on the case in which Keeton had a judgement [sic] entered or a sentence
imposed (this case), the Court will not grant Keeton's request for credit for time
served in his previously dismissed Bannock County case, CR-2018-925-FE.
(R., p.128 (footnotes omitted and footnote citations added in brackets).) Mr. Keeton timely
appealed. (R., pp.130-32.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Keeton's motion for credit for time served for his
prejudgment incarceration in a dismissed but then refiled case with the same offense?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Keeton's Motion For Credit For Time Served For
His Prejudgment Incarceration In A Dismissed But Then Refiled Case With The Same Offense

A.

Introduction
Idaho Code § 18-309 mandates an award of credit for any prejudgment incarceration "if

such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was
entered." LC. § 18-309(1). In Owens and Brand, the Court identified "the offense" as the
operative term to determine whether a defendant is entitled to credit. Mr. Keeton was
incarcerated prior to the entry of judgment for "the offense" for which the judgment was entered,
yet the district court denied him credit for time served. The district court denied credit because,
even though "the offense" remained the same, the case charging that offense was dismissed and
later refiled. Mr. Keeton asserts the district court's denial of credit was in error. The plain
language ofl.C. § 18-309, and the Court's analysis of that language in Owens and Brand, require
an award of credit for any prejudgment incarceration in dismissed but refiled case with the same
offense.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court exercises "free review over statutory interpretation because it is a question of

law." Owens, 158 Idaho at 3.

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Keeton's Motion For Credit For Time
Served Because, Although The Case Was Initially Dismissed And Later Refiled,
Mr. Keeton Was Incarcerated For The Offense For Which The Judgment Was Entered
Idaho Code § 18-309 governs credit for time served for prejudgment incarceration.

Owens, 158 Idaho at 3. It states in relevant part: "In computing the term of imprisonment, the
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person against whom the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an
included offense for which the judgment was entered." LC. § 18-309(1). This "part of the statute
requires courts to give a person credit on his sentence for the time he served in jail before he was
convicted of or pied guilty to his crime." Owens, 158 Idaho at 3 (citing Law v. Rasmussen, 104
Idaho 455, 457 (1983)).
In two recent cases, Brand and Owens, the Court held the language of LC. § 18-309 is
unambiguous. Brand, 162 Idaho at 192; Owens, 158 Idaho at 4-6.
Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain language. State v. Burnight,
132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999). That language "is to be given its plain, obvious and
rational meaning." Id. If that language is clear and unambiguous, "the Court need
merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction." Id.
Brand, 162 Idaho at 191. Both Brand and Owens examined the statute's specific condition also
at issue here: "if such incarceration was for the offense ... for which the judgment was entered."
Brand, 162 Idaho at 191-93; Owens, 158 Idaho at 3-6. After applying the plain language, Brand
and Owens both held this condition mandated an award of credit "for the offense," despite other
factors pertaining to the defendant's incarceration. Brand, 162 Idaho at 192-93; Owens, 158
Idaho at 3-6.
First, in Owens, the Court considered whether a defendant received credit for time served
on each offense in a multiple count case with consecutive sentences. 158 Idaho at 3-6. The
Owens Court held the statute's plain language mandated an award of credit for each offense. Id.
at 4. The Court reasoned:
First, Idaho Code section 18-309 mandates that a court gives a defendant credit
for his time served because the statute states that a person "shall" receive credit.
Second, section 18-309 specifies that a person "shall receive credit in the
judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment . . . . "
LC.§ 18-309. The statute continues to provide that a defendant gets the credit
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only on a requirement that incarceration was for "the offense or an included
offense for which the judgment was entered." The statute has a mandatory
directive that specifically conditions credit for time served on the fact that the
incarceration was for "the offense" for which the judgment was entered.
Id. (second emphasis added). Thus, the condition "simply describes the type of incarceration that

a defendant gets credit for." Id. "[A]s long as the defendant's prejudgment jail time was for 'the
offense' the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for, the court gives the defendant that
credit." Id. If this condition is met, the statute "does not limit that credit in any way." Id. In light
of this plain language, the defendant in Owens was entitled to credit for his prejudgment
incarceration "on each of the eight separate offenses," regardless of the fact that his sentences
were to be served consecutively. Id.
Second, in Brand, the Court considered whether a defendant received credit for time
served on an offense when the defendant's prejudgment incarceration was "both initiated and
maintained due to a prior, unrelated offense." 162 Idaho at 191. The Brand Court again held the
statute's plain language mandated an award of credit for the offense. Id. at 192-93. The Court
explained:
Section 18-309 does not limit credit for time served only if, for example, the
offense for which the defendant is jailed is that which caused the defendant's
initial deprivation of liberty. Rather, section 18-309 applies to all offenses that
provide a basis for the defendant's incarceration. It is irrelevant if the defendant's
incarceration rests on several, unrelated offenses, as the fact remains that each
offense provides a basis for the defendant's incarceration.
Id. at 192. The statute's emphasis on "the offense" led the Court to develop a two-part test: (1)

whether the defendant was incarcerated during the time between his arrest and the entry of the
judgment of conviction and (2), if so, whether "the relevant offense ... provides a basis for the
defendant's incarceration," irrespective of "any alternative reason for the defendant's
incarceration." Id. at 192-93. Applying this test from the statute's plain language, the defendant
in Brand was entitled to credit for his prejudgment incarceration for an offense, even though he
8

was already in custody on an unrelated charge at the time of service of the arrest warrant for the
offense. Id. at 190, 193.
As in Brand and Owens, the "offense" language also controls here. When a case charging
a particular offense is dismissed and then a new case is filed with the same offense, the plain
language of LC. § 18-309(1) mandates an award of credit for that offense. It is "irrelevant"
whether the defendant was incarcerated for that offense during the dismissed case or the refiled
case. Brand, 162 Idaho 192. "[T]he fact remains" that the offense "provides a basis for the
defendant's incarceration." Id. The district court must give credit for "any" prejudgment
incarceration for "the offense" resulting in the defendant's conviction and sentence. Owens, 158
Idaho at 4 ("[A]s long as the defendant's prejudgment jail time was for 'the offense' the
defendant was convicted of and sentenced for, the court gives the defendant that credit.").
The "offense" language must "steer" this "result" because any other interpretation would
alter the statute's plain language. Brand, 162 Idaho at 192. In fact, the Owens Court recognized
that a term other than "the offense" would lead to different results: "If the legislature had
delineated credit for incarceration for 'each case' or another description other than 'the offense,'
the outcome would be different." 158 Idaho at 4; see also Brand, 162 Idaho 192 (quoting this
language from Owens). For instance, if LC. § 18-309 required the incarceration for "the case
number" for which the judgment was entered, then it is likely a defendant would not receive
credit for a dismissed but then refiled case charging the same offense. The refiled case would
have a different case number. The word "offense," however, focuses on the underlying criminal
conduct. "Offense" is defined as the act (or failure to act) committed in violation of the law. See
I.C. § 18-109 ("A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a law
forbidding or commanding it .... "); see also Offense, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.

9

2014) ("A violation of the law; a crime, often a minor one."); Crime, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
("An act that the law makes punishable; the breach of a legal duty treated as the subject-matter of
a criminal proceeding."). Thus, the legislature's use of "the offense" refers to prejudgment
incarceration for the criminal act as charged by the State. The plain meaning of "the offense,"
rather than another description, mandates an award of credit for a dismissed and refiled case
charging an identical offense.
Applying the plain language, Mr. Keeton is entitled to credit for his thirty-two days of
prejudgment incarceration. The "relevant offense"-the felony DUI committed on January 20provided "the basis" for his incarceration. Brand, 162 Idaho at 193. Put another way, the district
court must give Mr. Keeton credit "as long as [his] prejudgment jail time was for 'the offense'
the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for." Owens, 158 Idaho at 4; accord Brand, 162
Idaho at 193. He has met that requirement. Despite the fact that the case as a whole was
dismissed and refiled (due to the State's error in felony enhancement), the offense remained the
same. (See R., pp.10-12, 97-98, 126.) Mr. Keeton should have received credit for the time that
he was incarcerated for the felony DUI offense.
In light of LC. § 18-309's plain language, Owens, and Brand, the district court's order
denying Mr. Keeton credit was in error. The district court incorrectly focused on the judgment
and the case. The district court determined, "The credit only applies to cases where a judgment
has been entered." (R., p.128.) The district court reasoned, because Mr. Keeton did not have a
sentenced imposed in the dismissed case and was not incarcerated in the instant case, "there was
no time spent on the case in which Keeton had a judgement [sic] entered or sentence imposed
(this case)." (R., p.128.) Although it is true that credit can only be awarded in a case where a
judgment has been entered, the "judgment" does not provide the basis for credit. The offense
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does. Credit is awarded by "the offense," and no other factor. See Brand, 162 Idaho at 192-93;
Owens, 158 Idaho at 3-6. In using the judgment and the case to determine credit, the district
court altered the statute's plain language and acted contrary to the Court's holdings in Owens and
Brand. Pursuant to the plain language of LC. § 18-309, the district court was required to give
Mr. Keeton credit for his prejudgment incarceration for the felony DUI offense.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Keeton respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
credit for time served and remand this case to the district court with an instruction to enter an
order granting thirty-two days of credit for time served.
DATED this 18th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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